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DOE/DHS/DOT Volpe Technical Meeting on Electric Vehicle and Charging Station Cybersecurity Report

DOE/DHS/DOT Volpe Technical Meeting on Electric Vehicle and Charging Station Cybersecurity Report

Prepared by:

United States Department of Transportation Volpe Center and United States Department of Energy Office of Policy

Final Report—March 2018

DOT-VNTSC-DOE-18-01

Prepared for: U.S. Department of Energy. 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, DC 20585-1615

U.S. Department of Transportation, Volpe Center

  1. Disclaimer
  2. Acknowledgments
  3. Contents
  4. List of Figures
  5. List of Tables
  6. List of Abbreviations
  7. Executive Summary

Disclaimer

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

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March  2018 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Meeting Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
DOE/DHS/DOT Volpe Technical Meeting on Electric Vehicle and Charging Station Cybersecurity
Report
5a. FUNDING NUMBERS VXU6A1/RE572 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Kevin Harnett, Brendan Harris, Daniel Chin, Graham Watson
5b. CONTRACT NUMBER 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Department of Transportation 

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 55 Broadway

Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER DOT-VNTSC-DOE-18-01  

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave., S.W.

Washington, DC 20585-1615

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
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This document is available to the public on the National Transportation Library (NTL) Repository and Open Science Access Portal (ROSA P) website at:  https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/34991
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 
On November 29-30, 2017, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Policy (OP), in collaboration with DOE’s Vehicle Technology Office (VTO), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Cyber Security Division (CSD), and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe), held a technical meeting on key aspects of electric vehicle (EV) and electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) cybersecurity. This report summarizes key takeaways and discussion points. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Electric Vehicle (EV), Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), Cybersecurity, Charging Station, Smart Grid, 
Utility, Building Energy Management Systems (BEMS), Vehicle Technology Office (VTO) 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
28 
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
 OF REPORT 
UNCLASS 
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
 OF THIS PAGE 
UNCLASS 
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
 OF ABSTRACT 
UNCLASS 
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unlimited

Acknowledgments

The Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. DOT Volpe Center would like to thank subject matter experts (SMEs) from the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) Vehicle-Grid Integration Communications Protocol Working Group, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Lear Corporation, Fiat Chrysler Automotive (FCA), and Daimler AG for their insight on topics in this report. In addition, we would like to acknowledge and give thanks to all the organizations who participated in the DOE/DHS/DOT Volpe Center Technical Meeting on Electric Vehicle and Charging Station Cybersecurity on November 29-30, 2017, in Arlington, VA, and for providing their insights and expertise.

Contents

  • List of Figures

  • List of Tables

  • List of Abbreviations

  • Executive Summary

  • Background/Introduction

    • 1.1 Structure of the Report

    • 1.2 General Vehicle Cybersecurity Concerns Background

      • 1.2.1 Telematics

      • 1.2.2 Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus

    • 1.3 Cybersecurity Considerations for the Electric Vehicle

      • 1.3.1 Stakeholders
  • 2 Organizational Structure

  • 3 Incorporating Cybersecurity into Design

    • 3.1 Segmentation

    • 3.2 Chipsets

    • 3.3 Penetration Testing

    • 3.4 Vulnerability Assessment

    • 3.5 EVSE Cybersecurity Procurement Guidelines

  • 4 Trust

  • 5 Ownership and Maintenance

  • 6 Coordination

    • 6.1 Standards Coordination

    • 6.2 Public Sector Coordination

    • 6.3 Private Sector Coordination

    • 6.4 Public-Private Coordination

  • 7 Gaps and Conclusions

    • 7.1 Identified Gaps

      • 7.1.1 EV Charging Infrastructure Lacks Cybersecurity Best Practices

      • 7.1.2 End-to-end EV and Charging Infrastructure Lacks a Trust Model

      • 7.1.3 EV/Charging Infrastructure Lacks Cybersecurity Testing

      • 7.1.4 Wireless Chargers Lack Common Cybersecurity Guidelines

      • 7.1.5 Security of EV Over-the-Air (OTA) Infrastructure Update Capability

      • 7.1.6 Commercial EVSE Lack of Common Physical Security Guidelines

    • 7.2 Conclusions and Critical Gaps

  • Appendix A - Electric Vehicle Technical Standards Overview

List of Figures

  • Figure 1. Typical Telematics System

List of Tables

  • Table 1. Typical Data Elements Exchanged Between an EV and Charging Station

  • Table 2. EV and Charging Infrastructure Stakeholders

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation
Term
ADR 
Automated Demand Response 
AMI 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
BEMS 
Building Energy Management System 
CAN 
Controller Area Network 
CCC 
Chaos Communications Conference 
CCS 
Combined Charging System 
CD 
Compact Disk 
CDMA 
Code Division Multiple Access 
CEMS 
Central Energy Management Systems 
CharlN e.V. 
The Charging Interface Initiative 
DC 
Direct Current 
DCFC 
DC Fast Charger 
DHS S&T CSD 
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Cybersecurity Division 
DIN 
Deutsches Institut für Normung e.V.  (the German Institute for Standardization) 
DOE 
Department of Energy 
DOS 
Denial of Service 
DOT 
Department of Transportation 
DSO 
Distribution System Operator 
ECU 
Electronic Control Unit 
EESA 
Electrical Energy Storage Assemblies 
ENCS 
European Network for Cyber Security 
ESCC 
Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council 
ESCSWG 
Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group 
EV 
Electric Vehicle 
EVSE 
Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment 
FISMA 
Federal Information Security Management Act 
GPS 
Global Positioning System 
GSM 
Global System for Mobile Communications 
HAN 
Home Area Network 
HITB 
Hack-in-the-Box 
ICT 
Information and Communications Technologies 
IDS 
Intrusion Detection System 
IEEE 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF 
Internet Engineering Task Force 
INL 
Idaho National Laboratory 
IoT 
Internet of Things 
ISO 
International Organization of Standardization 
ISO 
Independent System Operator 
Abbreviation
Term
LEV 
Light Electric Vehicle 
MITM 
Man In The Middle 
NEC 
National Electrical Code 
NERC 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
NESCOR 
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource 
NFC 
Near Field Communications
NHTSA 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
NIST 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NSTC 
National Science and Technology Council 
OBD 
On-Board Diagnostic 
OCA 
Open Charge Alliance 
OEM 
Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OP 
Office of Policy 
OTA 
Over The Air 
PEV 
Plug-In Electric Vehicle 
PHEV 
Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
PIN 
Personal Identification Number 
RF 
Radio Frequency 
RTO 
Regional Transmission Organization 
SAE  
Society of Automotive Engineers 
SD 
Secure Digital 
SME 
Subject Matter Expert 
SMS 
Short Message Service 
TLS 
Transportation Layer Security 
TPMS 
Tire Pressure Monitoring System 
UMTS 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
USB 
Universal Serial Bus 
V2G 
Vehicle to Grid 
V2I 
Vehicle to Infrastructure 
V2V 
Vehicle to Vehicle 
VTO 
Vehicle Technology Office 
W3C 
World Wide Web Consortium 
WPT 
Wireless Power Transfer 
XSS 
Cross-site scripting

Executive Summary

On November 29-30, 2017, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Policy (OP), in collaboration with DOE’s Vehicle Technology Office (VTO), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Cyber Security Division (CSD), and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (U.S. DOT) John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) held a technical meeting on key aspects of electric vehicle (EV) and electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) cybersecurity. This report summarizes key takeaways and discussion points.

Electric vehicles are becoming a part of the transportation and mobility industry in the United States. It is during this initial development and deployment period for the EV environment that the opportunity exists to mitigate cybersecurity issues before they become widespread, ingrained, difficult, and expensive to remedy. The EV environment is a mix of multiple stakeholders, domains, hardware, and software. As the communication, electricity, and transportation systems become more integrated, cybersecurity vulnerabilities that would normally be localized, now have the ability to cause disruptions across these multiple sectors.

Modern day automobiles have cybersecurity vulnerabilities that the industry and government are working on addressing.1 This report, and the preceding technical meeting, focuses on the cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are unique to electric vehicles and electric vehicle supply equipment:

  • The two-way communication between the EVSE and the vehicle

  • The connection between EVs, EVSE, and other systems (e.g., grid, telecommunications, buildings, etc.)

These differences could potentially lead to three main types of issues:

  • 1) Public safety hazard to the vehicle operators and/or those in the immediate vicinity

  • 2) Mobile, highly connected malware vectors

  • 3) Initiating and/or exacerbating electric grid disruption

As a result of discussions during the Electric Vehicle and Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity Technical Meeting, participants identified gaps and vulnerabilities in this threat space (see Chapter 7: Gaps and Conclusions for more detail on the gaps). The table below is a prioritized list of the gaps identified and provides a short description of each:


1https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/vehicle-cybersecurity


Identified Gap

Gap Description

EVSE Charging Infrastructure
Lacks Cybersecurity Best Practices
The EV industry does not have secure software design and development methodology guidance to design and build 
“secure” EVSE capabilities. Purchasing agents who buy EVSEs do not typically specify cybersecurity protections (e.g. secure OTA firmware update capability, authentication) for their EVSE products due to lack of EVSE cybersecurity guidelines for the EVSE acquisitions.   
End-to-End EV and Charging
Infrastructure Lacks a Trust
Model  
 
There is no consensus on end-to-end trusted communication standards for securing communications between the electric vehicle and the charging infrastructure. 
EV/Charging Infrastructure Lacks
Cybersecurity Testing  
There is a lack of formal cybersecurity testing and assessment applied to the entire EV charging infrastructure. 
Wireless Chargers Lack Common
Cybersecurity Guidelines  
Light passenger EVs, electric buses and electric trucks have similar wireless charging communications paths, and none of them have guidance on the unique cybersecurity requirements specifically for wireless charging. 
EV Over-the-Air (OTA)
Infrastructure Update Capability
Is Immature  
 
Current EV infrastructure (i.e. EVSEs, Smart Meters, Advanced Metering Infrastructure-AMI, Demand Energy Response equipment, etc). OTA update capability is immature and insecure and vulnerable to cyberattacks. Insecure legacy equipment will need to be addressed at the same time as new EV equipment is designed to have better and more secure OTA capabilities.  
Commercial EVSE Lack of
Common Physical Security
Guidelines
Physical damage to commercial EVSEs can result in nonoperational units which could have an adverse effect on consumer confidence in EVs in general.  Some types of physical damage whether intentional or not, may expose the public to harmful electric current levels.  There is a lack of common Physical Security Guidelines for Commercial EVSE Physical Security.

Throughout the technical meeting, participants particularly focused on two of these gaps as critical for government and industry to address:

  • 1.The lack of security best practices for EVSE charging infrastructure

  • 2.The lack of an end-to-end trust model for validating communications

Addressing these critical gaps should help focus and frame coordination between the relevant stakeholders in the energy, transportation, and communication sectors.


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