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Defending Democracy: Taking Stock of the Global Fight Against Digital Repression, Disinformation, and Election Insecurity

Washington and Lee Law Review

Volume 77, Issue 4, Article 7

Fall 2020

Scott J. Shackelford

Chair, IU-Bloomington Cybersecurity Program; Executive Director, Ostrom Workshop; Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana
Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, [email protected] Website

Angie Raymond

Data Governance Program Director, Ostrom Workshop; Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University Kelley School of Business. Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, [email protected] Website

Abbey Stemler

Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University Kelley School of Business; Faculty Associate, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, [email protected] Website

Cyanne Loyle

Associate Professor of Political Science, Penn State University; Global Fellow, Peace Research Institute Oslo. Penn State University, [email protected] Website

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1. Abstract
2. Table of Contents

Abstract

Amidst the regular drumbeat of reports about Russian attempts to undermine U.S. democratic institutions from Twitter bots to cyber-attacks on Congressional candidates, it is easy to forget that the problem of election security is not isolated to the United States and extends far beyond safeguarding insecure voting machines. Consider Australia, which has long been grappling with repeated Chinese attempts to interfere with its political system. Yet Australia has taken a distinct approach in how it has sought to protect its democratic institutions, including reclassifying its political parties as “critical infrastructure,” a step that the U.S. government has yet to take despite repeated breaches at both the Democratic and Republican National Committees.

This Article analyzes the Australian approach to protecting its democratic institutions from Chinese influence operations and compares it to the U.S. response to Russian efforts. It then moves on to discuss how other cyber powers, including the European Union, have taken on the fight against digital repression and disinformation, and then compares these practices to the particular vulnerabilities of Small Pacific Island Nations. Such a comparative study is vital to help build resilience, and trust, in democratic systems on both sides of the Pacific. We argue that a multifaceted approach is needed to build more resilient and sustainable democratic systems. This should encompass both targeted reforms focusing on election infrastructure security—such as requiring paper ballots and risk-limiting audits—with deeper structural interventions to limit the spread of misinformation and combat digital repression.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Unpacking the Cyber Threat to Democracies

• A. Understanding Election Insecurity
• B. A Brief History of Cyber-Enabled Election Interference
• C. Digital Repression

III. U.S. Efforts to Protect Democratic Institutions

• A. U.S. Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure
  • 1.Federal & State Approaches to Election Security
  • 2.Private Sector & Civil Society Efforts
• B. U.S. Attempts to Combat Digital Repression
• C. Critiques of U.S. Response

IV. Lessons from Other Democracies

• A. European Union
  • 1.EU Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure
  • 2.EU Efforts to Combat Digital Repression
• B. Illustrative Examples: Australia, Oceania, and Asia
  • 1.Australia
  • 2.Oceania
  • 3.Asia
• C. Summary

V. Implications for Policymakers
VI. Conclusion